Northern Ireland is rarely mentioned in the debate on the UK's membership of the EU. However, a potential Brexit will have a significant impact on the social and economic situation in the country. In this article, Edward Burke argues that politicians in Westminster and Stormont have failed to address the risks associated with the UK's departure from the union. These may adversely affect the region's prosperity and the delicate peace process.
Ireland's leaders find that the future integrity and sovereignty of the UK is being decided in Edinburgh, London and Brussels, conversations over which they have little influence. Alarmingly, on matters of fundamental importance to the UK, such as Scottish independence or UK membership of the EU, Northern Ireland's interests have scarcely been considered. To some, particularly English voters, this might seem entirely proportional -after all Northern Ireland makes up only 3 per cent of the UK's population. For decades Northern Ireland demanded, and received, attention as a consequence of its dysfunctional political structures and sectarian violence -and, so the logic goes, it has received more than enough from the rest of the UKincluding almost £9.6 billion in British subsidies in 2014, amounting to almost £5,200 a year for each inhabitant. 1 Despite the continuing transfer of large annual subsidies from the Treasury, MPs on 'the mainland' are now prone to ignoring Northern Ireland. The Scottish National Party has long found Ulster politics to be an uncomfortable topic; Scotland has its choose 'in favour of my duty versus my inclinations' when it came to considering Irish concerns in the Union rather than following his own English prejudices. Villiers saw that a larger principle was at stake, namely confidence that the government in London would act in the interests of the weaker parts of the Union. 5 The current secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Theresa Villiers, has faced the same dilemma confronted by her ancestor but has come to a very different conclusion. Critics of the secretary of state accuse Villiers of taking a narrowly English view of the EU, refusing to acknowledge that Northern Ireland's interests are better served by the UK remaining a member of the EU. 6 Villiers's comments have largely been confined to stating that the UK would prosper outside the EU if it opted for Brexit. 7 She has also led efforts to gain the right for her and other members of cabinet to campaign against government policy in favour of leaving the EU. 8 Meanwhile, the Conservative MP who chairs the House of Commons Select Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Laurence Robertson, has been even more explicit, claiming that he has never supported the UK's membership of the EU and will actively campaign to leave. A Labour MP on the committee, Kate Hoey, is also a leading voice in the Vote Leave campaign (of the thirteen members of the committee, only three could be labelled as longstanding and vocal supporters of EU membership). 9 18 Third, many Unionist representatives adopt a simplistic arithmetic formula to calculate the benefits of EU membership for Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK.
Such an argument is persistently made by the deputy leader of the DUP, Nigel Dodds: 'Each year we pay in £19 billion and get back £10 billion, a deficit … It's our own money coming back at a reduced rate … As things stand I would certainly be voting to come out'. 19 Another DUP MP, Jim Shannon, has spoken about the negative effect Europe has had on Northern Irish business: 'The worst of Europe damages the best of Britain. That is how I feel about the issue, and that is how I believe many others feel about it. The worst of Europe means red tape for businesses, mass immigration and less money for hard-working taxpayers'. 20 criticising the EU's recent record during Dublin's debt crisis. 21 The party has also campaigned against successive EU referendums in the South. 22 Consequently, the party leadership knows it has to be careful not to be too fulsome in its support for the EU in Northern Ireland during the referendum campaign to avoid drawing attention to inconsistencies that could damage the party's credibility. 23 The SDLP is vocally pro-EU but is a much-diminished force compared to its status the 1990s. 24 In such a vacuum the Irish government emerged as the most coherent advocate of Northern Ireland (and implicitly the wider UK) staying in the EU -to the extent that Arlene Foster has publicly criticised such 'meddling' or 'scaremongering from outside interests'. 25 However, the recent political deadlock in Ireland following February's inconclusive general election has arguably diverted attention away from the Brexit issue. 26 The debate in Northern Ireland on the merits of Brexit has become increasingly polarised. With few Unionist representatives willing to make the case for the EU, 27 However, it is the legacy of the Troubles, the persistent breakdown of trust and institutional co-operation in the Stormont executive and Assembly that most seriously hinders a serious cross-party policy discussion of the UK's membership of the EU in Northern Ireland. 28 
The Dublin Dimension
The Irish government views the prospect of the UK leaving the EU as a major threat to the Irish economy, Anglo-Irish political ties and cross-border cooperation in counter-terrorism/serious crime investigation. 29 An Irish diplomat pointed out that 'The issue [Brexit] is just too important for us. Northern Ireland is just one small part of the UK; it is a large part of the island of Ireland'. 30 In the area of trade, NorthSouth commerce is already negatively affected by 'an international land border between a small state and a region of a larger state that have tax systems that are not very harmonised and currencies that can fluctuate rapidly and through large margins.' 31 According to the government in Dublin, the EU, particularly the single market and the role of the European Commission, is a critical means of eliminating, or at least reducing, such structural disadvantages. The harmonisation of customs procedures and the development of cross-border programmes to stimulate economic activity, effectively removed much of the red tape that restricted trade in the past. 32 The UK is Ireland's largest trading partner accounting for 17 per cent of Irish exports.
More than €1 billion of goods and services are exchanged between the two countries every week; bilateral trade amounted to more than €62 billion in 2014. 33 The Irish government has also estimated that over 200,000 UK jobs depend on exports to Ireland. Ireland receives more UK exports than China, India and Brazil combined -€18 billion of British goods and services were imported by Ireland in often criticised in London as evidence of the UK's failure to expand its trade relationships. 35 However, such criticism, at least to Irish ears, can smack of complacency or a lack of appreciation of Anglo-Irish ties. 36 There has been a significant increase in trade between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland since the Good Friday Agreement (partly facilitated by North-South bodies and programmes funded by the EU aimed at stimulating economic co-operation and investment). 37 Irish officials do not argue that this trade relationship would disappear overnight. However, they see a period of uncertainty -including the lengthy negotiations of new bilateral agreements -as likely to incur serious economic losses to both countries: '"Brexit", like it or not, is a leap into the unknown'. 38 Irish officials are dismayed by the lengthy UK introspection on its membership of the EU, particularly because the two countries share very similar views on deepening the European Single Market, including the creation of a digital single market. 39 The Irish government has been at pains to point out that the vote on the EU is a choice for UK voters alone claiming its stark warnings to London of the negative consequences is merely advice from 'a friend'. 40 In private, however, Irish diplomats admit that they are in effect, if discreetly, in campaign mode -a special unit has been set up in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to deal with Brexit issues and to advise on the referendum. Dublin is also mindful that 330,000 Irish citizens are eligible to vote in UK referendums, with a similar number of UK citizens living in the Republic of Ireland who are also entitled to cast a ballot. 41 Common membership of the EU has served to greatly improve relations between the UK and Ireland. According to the Irish minister for foreign affairs and trade, Charles Flanagan, working together in Brussels 'helped us appreciate that we have more in common with one another than with any other member state'. 42 Bilateral meetings in Brussels, away from the emotional pressures of domestic politics, solidified a relationship that overcame mutual differences over Northern Ireland in order to counter the threat of terrorism and advance the peace process. 43 Moreover, joint EU membership also helps to underpin the Good Friday Agreement. The Irish government -having ceded Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution (claiming jurisdiction over the whole island) -leaned on a collective European identity as a means of reassuring Nationalists in Northern Ireland that the island, despite this constitutional change, would come closer together. 44 The UK's part in a wider European identity, articulated through its membership of the EU, is also attractive to those who, although they have come to accept UK sovereignty over Northern Ireland, are uncomfortable with being identified as British. 45 suspected criminals or terrorists were handed over to the UK authorities by Ireland under the EAW. 48 Other European police and judicial bodies such as Europol and Eurojust are also frequently used by the British and Irish police, and security agencies during counter-terrorism and criminal investigations on both sides of the border (Europol establishes procedures for the exchange of crime intelligence for police operations; Eurojust facilitates the collection and exchange of information and evidence for the prosecution of transnational criminal or terrorist networks). 49 The largely neglected British-Irish Council (created under the Good Friday Agreement) could serve as an overarching body to replace EU agreements on a bilateral basis.
However, David Cameron has largely ignored the council since he became prime minister. 50 
Counting the Costs of an Ulster Brexit
The key questions in the current debate centre on whether the EU makes a positive contribution to Northern Ireland and on the specific threats of a Brexit to the country's security and economy. First, as Northern Irish officials acknowledge, agencies such Europol, Eurojust and tools like the EAW, developed over many years, are exceptionally important to the security of the country and not easily replaced. 51 The economic effect of Brexit is less certain, debated by politicians and economists alike. However, Northern Ireland is a major beneficiary of EU programme funds. Programme funds of any region in the UK. 55 The Northern Irish economy has a number of structural disadvantages -a person of working age in Northern Ireland is more likely than anywhere else in the UK to have no qualifications. 56 The EU has million has been allocated for the PEACE IV Programme; this funding is in addition to regional-development funding which will be spent in Northern Ireland and along the border region in the Republic of Ireland between 2014 and 2020. 58 The effect of such programmes is difficult to quantify; anecdotal evidence suggests positive outcomes, as does the decline in inter-community violence. 59 Northern Ireland's civil-society sector has also helped to mitigate tensions during long periods of political deadlock.
Some funding is also forthcoming from the Northern Ireland Executive, including for the independent Community Relations Council, but official Northern Irish bodies are unable to fund some politically sensitive activities, such as those that involve former paramilitaries (so-called ex-prisoners' groups). This is a uniquely important EU contribution (with some assistance from the Irish government's Reconciliation Fund, for which the 2015 budget amounted to €2.7 million). 60 The potential withdrawal of such funds risks undermining the cross-community dialogue, community and mental-health projects that have been put in place since the Good Friday Agreement.
Compared with the rest of the UK, Northern Ireland is disproportionately dependent on EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) payments. The agri-food industry is a critical employer, responsible for approximately 6 per cent of all jobs in Northern Ireland in 2014; agriculture alone accounts for three times the UK average as an employer. Northern Ireland's biggest private sector enterprise is Moy Park, a poultry processing firm. 61 Northern Irish farmers expect to receive close to €2.5 billion in CAP payments from 2014 to 2020 (the total income generated from farmingexcluding subsidies -in Northern Ireland amounted to £283 million in 2014). 62 Indeed the Ulster Farmers Union has warned the Stormont Executive of the importance of the CAP to farming, without which Northern Irish farmers would not be able to 'produce affordable food, look after the countryside, create jobs, and maintain rural communities'. 63 So far the government in London has not said if it will replace the UK's €25.1 billion CAP payments with a similar UK-only scheme. 64 The Fund, the European Social Fund, CAP, Interreg and PEACE, these would have to be quickly replaced by funding from London to avoid a more severe contraction of GDP than the 3 per cent figure forecast. 66 Funding from the European Investment Bank, which has consistently backed large infrastructure projects in Northern Ireland, including a recent €150 million loan to the University of Ulster, would also likely be severely reduced. 67 Northern Ireland has already been among the most recessionprone UK regions: its private sector shrank by 1.5 per cent between 2008 and 2013. 68 Unionists, such as Nigel Dodds and Sammy Wilson, counter that the devolution of corporate tax rates -part of the 2014 Stormont House Agreement between the parties in the Northern Ireland Executive aimed at resolving identity issues and forging agreement on welfare reform and fiscal responsibility -and the ending of fiscal transfers to the EU budget would outweigh any negative economic effects of Brexit. 69 However, London has attached difficult conditions to a deal that would allow the Northern Ireland Executive to set lower corporation tax rates similar to (or lower than) the 12.5 per cent flat rate in the Republic of Ireland. First, the Conservative government has insisted that the Northern Ireland block grant will be cut to mirror reduced fiscal revenues received from Northern Ireland. Second, such powers will only be transferred to Belfast in 2017 if the executive can demonstrate that it has a programme in place to balance its budget -a thorny issue for Sinn Féin, which has vowed to fight further cuts to the Northern Ireland budget, including plans to cut 7,000 public-sector jobs which Unionists claim were agreed under the Stormont House Agreement. 70 Northern Ireland's public sector currently accounts for 28 per cent of employment, four percentage points higher than Wales and ten points higher than England. 71 The Stormont executive's current budget deficit is running at an alarming 33 per cent of gross value added. 72 Sinn Féin and other parties may conclude that the long-term benefits of lower corporation taxes are not worth the short-term political fallout. A sharp reduction in public money for Northern Ireland would likely see an immediate slump in growth.
The prospect of a vastly increased transfer of funds -drawing on those which are currently part of the UK's contribution to Brussels -from London to Belfast also does not appear to hold much water. The UK contributed approximately £8.5 billion in post-rebate net contributions to the EU in 2015. 73 However, in the likely scenario that the UK wished to remain an integrated part of the European Single Marketakin to Norway -then it would have to make a substantial contribution to the EU budget but would not take part in EU decision-making, would be subject to EU regulations but would not be eligible for many EU funding programmes). 74 Based on its budgetary contribution, the 'Norway option' is not attractive to the UK; from 2009-2014, Norway was the tenth highest contributor to the EU budget, despite not being an EU member. 75 Theresa Villiers has declined to say whether London would meet funding gaps directly caused by the withdrawal of EU funds from Northern Ireland. 76 The mood in Westminster does not leave much room for optimism -83 per cent of Conservative MPs want to see the scrapping of the Barnett formula (the present system used to calculate the level of subsidies to UK devolved institutions), including significant cuts in payments to Scotland and Northern Ireland in order to spend more public money in England. 77 
Conclusion
Any fallout from Brexit to the UK's security or economy will be keenly felt in Ireland -with a more qualified workforce, a history of political stability and, crucially, an economy fully integrated into the EU as its only native English-speaking member state -would become an even more attractive place to invest in comparison to Northern Ireland. 78 The majority of English MPs are vocally against any increase in the block grant to Belfast. 79 
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